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STATE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PAROLE 
Administrative Appeal Decision Notice 
Inmate Name: SMITH, DARREN Facility: Clinton Correctional Facility 
NYSIDN Appeal Control #: 06-148-18 R 
Dept. DIN#: 92Al356 
Appearances: 
For the Board, the Appeals Unit 
For Appellant: 
Darren Smith (92Al 356) 
Clinton Correctional Facility 
Route 374, Cook Street, Box 2001 
Dannemora, New York 12929 
Board Member(s) who participated in appealed from decision: None. 
Decision appealed from: 5/2018 Revocation of Parole; 15-month hold. 
Pleadings considered: 
Brief on behalf of the Appellant submitted on: October 10, 2018. 
Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation. 
Documents relied upon: 
Notice of Violation, Violation of Release Report, Final Revocation Hearing Transcript, Parole Revocation 
Decision Notice. 
Final Determination: The undersigned have determined that the decision from which this appeal was taken 
\ \,,,.~ t c---
Commissioner 
d the same is hereby 
_. _ Affirmed _ Reversed for De Novo Hearing 
_ Vacated for De Novo Review of Time Assessment Only 
/Affirmed _ Reversed for De Novo Hearing 
_Vacated for De Novo Review of Time Assessment Only 
~rmed _ Reversed for De Novo Hearin.g 
_ Vacated for De Novo Review of Time Assessment Only 
_ Reversed - Violation Vacated 
Modified to ____ _ 
_ Reversed - Violation Vacated 
Modified to -----
_ Reversed - Violation Vacated 
Modified to--- - -
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation. of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons/or the.Parole Board's determination !!UJ§1. be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separ~te fjndings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on I 'J./lf./rlf' 
'-B 
Distribution: Appeals Unit- Inmate - Inmate's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(R) (May 2011) 
STATE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PAROLE 
 
STATEMENT OF APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
 
Inmate Name: SMITH, DARREN               Facility: Clinton Correctional Facility 
Dept. DIN#: 92A1356       Appeal Control #: 06-148-18 R 
Page: 1 
 
Findings: 
 
Appellant raises a number of issues in the brief he submitted in support of his 
administrative appeal initiated following the Administrative Law Judge’s (hereafter “ALJ”) 
decision to revoke Appellant’s parole and impose a hold of 15 months.  The Appeals Unit has 
reviewed each of the issues raised by Appellant, and finds that the issues have no merit. 
 
Appellant is serving an aggregate term of imprisonment of 15 years to Life after having 
been convicted of multiple crimes, which are: Attempted Murder in the first degree; Criminal Use 
of a Firearm in the second degree; Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the third 
degree; Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the second degree; and two counts of Criminal 
Possession of a Weapon in the third degree. 
 
A contested final revocation hearing was held before the ALJ on May 15, 2018.  Appellant 
raises the following issues in his brief: (1) the final revocation hearing was conducted in a manner 
that violated Appellant’s Due Process rights under both the New York State Constitution and the 
Constitution of the United States; (2) Appellant was not served with his Notice of Violation of 
parole in a timely manner; (3) the ALJ should have permitted Appellant to substitute another 
attorney in place of the attorney assigned to him by the Legal Aid Society; (4) Appellant was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel in his defense of the alleged parole violations brought 
against him by the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (hereafter 
“Department”) ; (5) the final revocation hearing was not completed in a timely manner; and (6) 
the length of the time assessment imposed by the ALJ following the final revocation hearing should 
have been reduced due to mitigating circumstances. 
 
 As to Appellant’s first issue, the only rights under the Due Process Clause at the Federal 
level held by an Appellant in a parole revocation proceeding include written notice of the claimed 
violations of parole, disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him, an opportunity to be heard 
in person and to present evidence, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, unless a 
hearing officer finds good cause for not allowing confrontation, a neutral and detached hearing 
body, and a written factfinding decision. Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); People ex rel. 
Walker v. New York State Division of Parole, 98 A.D.2d 33 (2d Dept. 1983).  This is partially 
because the parole revocation hearings are not designed to be adversarial, but rather, to be 
predictive and discretionary, in addition to any factfinding function. Gagnon v Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 
778 (1973). In addition, States have wide latitude under the U.S. Constitution to structure parole 
revocation proceedings, and may make it an informal, nonadversarial, administrative process. 
Pennsylvania Board of Probation v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998).  A parole revocation proceeding 
is not to be equated to a criminal prosecution, and should be flexible enough to consider letters,  
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affidavits, and other material that normally would not be admissible at a criminal trial. Morrissey 
v. Brewer, supra.  The parolee received all of these due process benefits.  
 
As for the New York State Due Process Clause, the statutory scheme enacted under section 
259-i of the Executive Law assures that a parolee’s due process rights are protected. People ex.rel. 
Matthews v. New York State Division of Parole, 58 N.Y.2d 196 (1983).  There are no specific 
allegations raised by Appellant which demonstrate that the provisions of Executive Law §259-i 
were not complied with.    
 
In response to Appellant’s second issue, testimony at the final revocation hearing clearly 
established that Appellant absconded from the State of New York without the permission of his 
parole officer.  A parole violation warrant (Warrant #783538) was issued on April 5, 2017, with a 
delinquency date of January 23, 2017.  On November 15, 2017, Newark, New Jersey police took 
Appellant into custody and notified New York State parole of his arrest and custody in the State 
of New Jersey.  New York State parole lodged the parole violation warrant on Appellant on 
November 15, 2017.  Appellant was extradited to New York and was served with his Notice of 
Violation on November 24, 2017.  He signed the Notice of Violation, and penned in “11-24-17” 
next to his signature on the Notice of Violation.  The Notice of violation provided for a preliminary 
hearing to be held on or before December 1, 2017.  A preliminary hearing was held on November 
29, 2017, and the Preliminary Hearing Officer (hereafter “PHO”) made a finding of probable cause 
as to Charge 3 as contained in the Violation of Release Report.  “[W]hen the Division lodges a 
detainer against an alleged parole violator in an out-of-state facility, the 15-day period is not 
triggered until the individual has completed the out-of-state sentence and is available for 
extradition.” People ex rel. Matthews v. New York State Division of Parole, 95 N.Y.2d 640, 645 
(2001).  Moreover, where the other jurisdiction has indicated that the parolee waived extradition 
but will not be available for pick up until a later date, even where there are no other holds, the 
warrant is not deemed executed until the later date specified by the holding state (and New York 
State authorities have no obligation to urge the other state to move the pick-up to an earlier date). 
People ex rel. Angel Reyes v. Warden, Index No. 250404/17 (Sup. Ct., Bronx Co., August 14, 
2017) (Boyle, J.).  The preliminary hearing was held in compliance with the provisions of 
Executive Law § 259-i(3)(c)(i) and the aforementioned legal authority, and any defects allegedly 
attending the preliminary revocation hearing were subsumed into the final hearing once it was 
completed, and have been rendered moot if not preserved on the record at the final revocation hearing. 
People ex rel. Allah v. Warden Rikers Island Correctional Facility, 22 A.D.3d 345 (1st Dept. 2005); 
People ex rel. Frett v. Warden Rikers Island, 25 A.D.3d 472 (1st Dept. 2006); Matter of Wescott v. 
New York State Board of Parole, 256 A.D.2d 1179 (4th  Dept. 1998); People ex rel. Chavis v. McCoy, 
236 A.D.2d 892 (4th  Dept. 1997). 
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 As to issues 3 and 4, there is no legal basis for permitting a parolee in a final revocation hearing 
to select an assigned counsel of his choice.  As to ineffective assistance of counsel claims, counsel 
“is presumed to have been competent and the burden is on the [Appellant] to demonstrate upon 
the record the absence of meaningful adversarial representation”. Matter of Jeffrey V., 82 N.Y.2d 
121, 126 (1993); People v. Hall, 224 A.D.2d 710 (2d Dept. 1996).  “[T]here is nothing to 
substantiate [Appellant’s] contention that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel as the 
record discloses that he received meaningful representation”. Matter of James v. Chairman of New 
York State Board of Parole, 106 A.D.3d 1300, 1300-1301 (3d Dept. 2013); see also, Matter of 
Rosa v. Fischer, 108 A.D.3d 1227 (4th Dept. 2013).  An ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
requires more than a showing of disagreement with defense counsel's strategy or tactics. Ordmandy 
v. Travis, 300 A.D.2d 713 (3d Dept. 2002); People v. Guay, 72 A.D.3d 1201 (3d Dept. 2010).  
Appellant’s hindsight disagreement with counsel’s tactics do not render counsel’s assistance 
ineffective. People ex rel. Williams v. Allard, 19 A.D.3d 890 (3d Dept. 2005).  Furthermore, the 
right to effective assistance of counsel does not entitle Appellant to a flawless performance by his 
counsel. People v. Groves, 157 A.D.2d 970.  Counsel for Appellant stated during the final hearing 
that his Office is handling revocation matters in court nearly every day.  Therefore, we could expect 
that the attorneys at the Legal Aid Society are well versed in handling parole revocation matters.  
Also of note, counsel for Appellant was successful in bringing about the dismissal of Charge 2 
contained in the Violation of Release Report.  Finally, both counsel and Appellant stated during 
the final revocation hearing that they had several discussions during adjournment appearances of 
the final hearing, and on the telephone, prior to the final hearing held on May 15, 2018.  There is, 
therefore, no basis to support issues 3 and 4 raised by Appellant in his brief. 
 
As to issue 5, Appellant asserts that the final revocation hearing was not held in a timely 
manner.  The final revocation hearing must be completed within 90 days from either the date probable 
cause is found at the preliminary hearing, or the date when the alleged violator waived his right to a 
preliminary hearing. 9 NYCRR §8005.17(a); §259-i (3)(f)(i).  Where a parolee is incarcerated in 
another state, the 90-day provision does not begin to run until he is returned to New York. People ex 
rel. Chapman v. New York State Board of Parole, 166 Misc.2d 890 (1995).  The Department was 
ready to begin the final hearing on January 3, 2018.  Appellant’s attorney asked for an adjournment 
at that time, and several other adjournments were requested by Appellant’s attorney over the next 
two months.  After considering the adjournments made at the request of Appellant or his counsel, 
the final hearing was commenced and completed in a timely manner. See  Executive Law § 259-i 
(3)(f)(i); 9 NYCRR §8005.17(ac)(ii). 
 
Finally, as to the length of the time assessment, Appellant is a Category 1 violator, so the 
ALJ must impose a minimum of 15 months as a time assessment, or a hold to maximum expiration  
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of the sentence, whichever is less, unless a mitigating reduction of up to three months is applied 
for a violator who accepts responsibility for his or her conduct, or unless there are exceptional 
mitigating circumstances. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §8005.20(c)(1); People ex rel. Newland v. Travis, 185 
Misc.2d 881 (Sup. Ct., Bronx Co., 2000).  The time assessment imposed here was not excessive. 
See, e.g., Matter of Wilson v. Evans, 104 A.D.3d 1190 (4th Dept. 2013); Matter of Rosario v. New 
York State Division of Parole, 80 A.D.3d 1030 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Bell v. Lemons, 78 
A.D.3d 1393 (3d Dept. 2010); Matter of Torres v. New York State Division of Parole, 58 A.D.3d 
1039 (3d Dept. 2009).  As to mitigating circumstances, it is the province of the ALJ to resolve 
credibility issues and to determine the relative weight to be accorded the evidence. Simpson v. 
Alexander, 63 A.D.3d 1495 (3d Dept. 2009);  Matter of Santiago v. Dennison, 45 AD3d 994 (3d 
Dept. 2007).  In doing so, we find no basis to support Appellant’s conclusion that the time 
assessment should have been reduced due to mitigating circumstances. 
 
Recommendation: 
 
 It is the recommendation of the Appeals Unit that the ALJ’s decision be affirmed.   
